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ABSTRACT
The report is divided into four chapters which deal, respectively,
with the technical and institutional conditions that shape geothermal
development, the factors that determine the value of a geothermal lease,
patterns of bidding for geothermal leases offered by the Federal govern-
ment, and the emerging structure of the geothermal industry.
The economically most important use of geothermal energy is central
station electricity generation. That process is characterized by un-
certainty, indivisibilities, and the need for coordinated investment
planning between steam developers and power plant owners. The process
will be affected by rate regulation of electric utilities and by land-
use regulations, especially those affecting Federal lands.
The value of a geothermal lease will be determined by conditions
on three markets: the regulated market in which utilities sell electric-
ity, the complex market in which a small number of utilities buy steam
from a potentially large number of suppliers, and the market in which
suppliers purchase land rights. If all markets were perfectly competi-
tive, a geothermal lease would sell for the capitalized value of the
stream of economic rents generated by the resource. Market power held
by some participants in those markets could reduce the rents actually
accruing to landowners. Based on 1970 cost estimates, estimates are
made of the value of a lease at the Geysers under competitive conditions
and under actual selling prices of geothermal leases. The values are
sensitive to tax laws and to the rate of return required.
Bids on Federal leases are analyzed to find a measure of the
amount being paid for geothermal leases at the Geysers, which is com-
pared to the values predicted under different market conditions. Diffi-
culties of interpreting this comparison due to the nature of competitive
bidding processes are also discussed. In addition, different patterns
of bidding behavior among types of geothermal resource areas and among
types of bidders are identified.
In the fourth chapter, some fragmentary data on ownership of
geothermal leases are assembled to give a preliminary estimate of
concentration ratios in geothermal energy. Factors that could explain
the apparently high concentration ratios are suggested.
The final chapter is a summary of conclusions and recommendations
for further research.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years it has become apparent that geothermal energy
forms an important, though relatively small, part of the energy re-
sources of the United States. Until now the development of the geo-
thermal resource has been largely in the hands of private industry
regulated and affected in numerous other ways by government agencies.
In this study of the past and current behavior of the geothermal energy
industry, we hope to form a basis in economic analysis for public policy
toward geothermal energy. The study focuses on the behavior of private
industry in geothermal development in order to begin to provide answers
to two classes of questions: 1) What is the effect of tax laws, regu-
latory decisions, and other governmental actions on geothermal devel-
opment; and 2) what patterns can we expect to observe in the present
and future actions of private industry?
Numerous concerns about these patterns have been expressed in
popular and governmental forums. A feature article in the Los Angeles
Times expressed what appears to be a widespread fear of the consequences
of the domination of the geothermal industry by a few large oil firms,
especially in their bidding on Federal geothermal leases. l The question
of industry structure and its relation to the Federal leasing program
will be explored at length in this report.
Problems of regulatory, environmental, and land use policy also
arise in regard to geothermal energy. Since a regulated electric util-
ity has a natural place in the development of geothermal energy. regula--
tory actions in regard to setting electricity rates and rates of return,
allowing entry into electricity production, and encouraging the entry
of electric utilities into geothermal steam production (vertical inte-
gration) can have important consequences. Finally, environmental and
land use consequences of geothermal development can only be predicted
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and controlled if the incentives facing geothermal developers and the
net benefits of geothermal development are understood.
To provide a factual basis for conclusions in these areas, we use
three types of data: bids on Federal leases by potential geothermal
developers, estimates of costs and revenues of geothermal steam pro-
duction and resulting generation of electricity, and measures of the
degree of concentration in the geothermal industry. The study begins
with a brief summary of technical and institutional facts useful for
understanding the cost of producing electricity from geothermal energy
and, especially, for understanding the nature of bids for geothermal
leases. In the second chapter we analyze the geothermal energy system
in three related markets: a market for land, a market for steam, and
a market for electricity. As participants in these markets, we find
landowners, geothermal developers, electric utilities, and electricity
consumers.
The distribution of the benefits of geothermal energy among the
four groups depends on the structure of each of the three markets.
Using rates of return on investment by geothermal developers, lease
prices. and electricity rates as data, we reach some tentative conclu-
sions about the distribution of these benefits. In the third chapter
we analyze bidding for Federal leases. We domonstrate first that
there are systematic, explainable patterns in the bids, and from these
patterns draw some inferences about the structure and behavior of the
geothermal industry. In the fourth chapter we examine well-known mea-
sures of concentration and the bidding behavior of oil companies with
a view to supporting some general conclusions about the degree of com-
petition in geothermal development. Results are summarized and sug-
gestions are made in a terse final chapter.
Although the study is an avowedly technical one, relying on
theoretical arguments to interpret and supplement the data, it is not
intended solely for the eyes of economists. Hence, short heuristic
-2-
recapitulations of major points appear throughout the text. Hopefully,
economists will forgive these asides, keeping in mind how unpleasant
non-economists find the technical sections.
The study was concluded on June 30, 1975, and does not reflect
events subsequent to December 31, 1974. All Federal lease sales held
prior to that data have been included in the analysis.
Footnotes
1. George Alexander, "Geothermal Energy: Oil Companies Scramble for
Control," Los Angeles Times, Monday, November II, 1974.
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CHAPTER 1
TECHNICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The distinctive features of the geothermal energy industry arise
from physical characteristics of the geothermal resource and specific
laws and institutional arrangements governing its use. Hence, before
proceeding to detailed theoretical and empirical analysis, we will pre-
sent a brief summary of relevant physical and institutional facts.
1.1 Technical Conditions of Production
Although geothermal resources can be used for many purposes, in-
cluding mineral extraction and low-level heating, the use which now
appears to have the largest potential economic significance is the
generation of electricity from geothermal fluid. l In order to produce
electricity, the geothermal fluid, which can be in a state ranging
from superheated steam to hot water, is obtained from wells and trans-
ported through pipelines to generating stations. The generating facil-
ity required differs with the chemical composition, temperature and
pressure of the steam, but in all cases uses turbines which operate at
low pressures compared to conventional steam plants, or will use secon-
2dary fluid systems. The electricity then must be transmitted to load
centers or a distribution grid. The only use of geothermal energy con-
sidered in this report will be the generation of electricity.
Allover the earth's surface, temperature increases with depth
below ground. In certain areas magma from the earth's interior in-
trudes an unusual distance into the surface layers. When underground
water is trapped near the intrusion and the resulting local concentra-
tions of heat, a reservoir of geothermally heated water or steam is
3
created. Those reservoirs accessible to drilling are of potential
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value as sources of energy. In the United States one such reservoir
located in Sonoma County, California, is currently being used to pro-
duce electricity on a commercial basis. Our description of actual
production practice, as opposed to general production possibilities,
will be based largely on operating practice at the Geysers, as this
field is known.
The first step in economic use of geothermal energy is the winning
of steam. This part of the production process involves large uncertain-
ties in all of its several stages. Geological and geophysical surveys
provide evidence of the possible existence of hot water or steam below
ground. Exploratory drilling can then, if successful, locate and pro-
vide some estimates of the quality of the reservoir. Until pressure,
temperature, and cheraical composition are ascertained, power generating
facilities cannot be designed. 4 The process of estimating the charac-
teristics of the geothermal fluid and the size of the reservoir is known
as "proving the reservoir". Even after the reservoir is proved, each
new well involves its own uncertainties.
Expansion of output in a field generally requires drilling of
additional wells. 5 Each such "step-out well" is of uncertain quality
because of two factors: the varying depth of the reservoir and changes
in the permeability of rock between known wells and the new well. At
the Geysers this uncertainty appears minimal: over 14 years between 1955
and 1969, 69 wells were drilled, and all but four produced economic
quantities of steam. In general, however, the quality of the fluid
obtained will vary with the location of wells in a field. Moreover,
in most cases the boundaries of a field are not themselves known until
6
after extensive testing and sinking of wells.
The geothermal fluid obtained from a successful well varies in
characteristics between fields. The Geysers and Lardarello (Italy)
fields produce dry steam with few mineral contaminants. Other wells,
such as those at Wairakei, New Zealand, produce a mixture of steam and
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water, In the Imperial Valley of California the mixture also contains
high concentrations of minerals which cause serious difficulties in
using the steam for power generation, At all fields currently utilized
for electricity generation, the fluid flows from the well under its own
pressure, although pumping is technically possible,7
Most authorities agree that the rate at which the fluid is ex-
tracted from a reservoir affects the pressure and temperature of the
fluid obtained. Spacing of wells and each well's flow rate, which is
a function of well diameter and depth. and the design wellhead pressure
determine the rate of extraction. S Increased flow rates reduce the
pressure of the steam obtained while those flow rates are in effect.
It is believed that individual wells have a finite life, and that
production rates drop off with time. Some authorities argue that this
decline in production is caused by the depositing of minerals, which
eventually close the cracks in underground rock through which the geo-
thermal fluid reaches the well, and that a new well might have the same
production rate as did a closed well when new,9 However, if a single,
unreplenished reservoir of water is the source of the fluid, the field
will dry up. It should be noted that the expert opinion accepted by a
Federal Tax Court in Reich, et al., holds that the reservoir is not re-
plenished and that extraction of a geothermal fluid depletes the reser-
voir. IO Since well construction costs currently exceed land acquisition
costs by an order of magnitude or more, the general expectation that any
well will have a life of twenty years or less is far more important to
economic incentives to invest in geothermal development than is the
possibility that the resource itself is depleted by use.
The geothermal fluid must be transported from the wellhead to a
generating plant in most cases, Although some studies indicate that at
11
some fields it is economic to place a small generator at each well,
at any large field it is possible to achieve economies of scale by col-
I t · f 11 d . . d . . 1 ·b· 12ec lng steam rom many we s an uSlng It to rlve a slng e tur lne,
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Costs of transporting the fluid vary with its characteristics. Super-
heated dry steam is cheapest to transport. Mixtures of water and steam
create technical transport difficulties which raise the cost of pipe-
lines, and fluids with low energy content must be protected against
losses in transportation by more expensive pipelines.
1 1 1 , f . 13c ear y can a so lncrease costs 0 transportatlon.
Corrosive fluids
For this reason
steam and water are generally separated at the wellhead.
Power turbines in geothermal generating plants are driven by steam.
which is either obtained directly from wells, as at the Geysers. sepa-
rated from mixtures of water and steam. or produced from hot water by
"flashing". Flashing requires a lowering of pressure to bring the fluid
into a vapor phase. Steam can be separated from water, or water flashed
to steam, before or after being transported from the well to the gener-
, f '1' 14atlng aCl lty.
Even at the Geysers the pressure of the steam at the power plant
is well below the pressures characteristic of power plants using arti-
ficially heated steam, whether nuclear or fossil fueled. The first
generating facility at the Geysers used the low pressure stage of an
obsolete steam turbine owned by Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E).lS
The low pressure lowers the thermodynamic efficiency of e1ectric-
16ity generation below that characteristic of thermal power plants.
Hence the "prime mover"* may involve higher capital costs per kilowatt
than other types of facility. The higher costs can be offset by savings
on the capital cost of steam production with oil or gas fired boilers
or a nuclear reactor, and on the the cost of fuel. The low pressures
mean that economies of scale in turbine construction are practically
exhausted in a 100 MW unit,17 owing in part to the large exit section
required.
*The "prime mover" is the part of the power plant, such as a turbine
that converts the energy of the working fluid. such as steam, into
electrical energy.
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The construction of generating capacity and drilling of wells
must be carefully coordinated in an optimal investment plan, so that
unusable steam or idle capacity is avoided. If geothermal fields are
depleted through exploitation, coordination between reservoir manage-
ment and the construction of generating capacity is also necessary
to match the life of the field to the life of the power plant. The
uncertainty characteristic of drilling in many fields, and an ownership
pattern in which one firm produces steam while another firm produces
electricity, can make this coordination difficult.
The transmission of electricity produced from geothermal energy
differs from transmission of electricity produced in other ways only in
the lack of flexibility in locating the power plant. The distance of a
field from load centers or existing transmission lines with excess ca-
pacity will affect its economic desirability.
After generating electricity, the steam condenses to water con-
taining various impurities which affect the nature and cost of disposal.
Moreover, in water fields the separated water, generally high in mineral
content, must be disposed of also. The need for reinjection wells can
raise the capital cost of geothermal energy.
In summary, there are four separate processes involved in geother-
mal power production: winning the fluid, transporting the fluid, produc-
ing electricity, and transporting electricity. The process of winning
the fluid is characterized by uncertainty and indivisibilities. The
nature of the reservoir necessitates coordination among steam producers
and between those producers and the owners of the generating facility.
Because of increasing losses of energy as pipelines become longer, the
location of the generating facility affects the value of individual
wells as a function of their location. Although the electricity gener-
ating process is not characterized by substantial increasing returns to
scale, the need to build transmission lines can set a minimum efficient
scale for power production.
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Electricity can be produced from geothermal steam at a total cost
per kilowatt which was estimated in 1973 as 5.3 mills/kwh. The same
source estimates total production cost in a coal-fired plant at 8.2
mills/kwh, nuclear at 9.6 mills/kwh, oil-fired at 10.0 mills/kwh, and
hydroelectric at 9.6 mills/kwh. In other fields, where mixtures of
steam and water are obtained from the wells, production costs with geo-
18
thermal energy rise, and are estimated at 9.7 mills/kwh. Current
estimates of production costs in nuclear power plants run as high as 22
mills/kwh. 19 Since geothermal production costs do not appear to have
risen as sharply, we can conclude that dry steam fields possess unam-
biguous cost advantages over other sources of energy for electricity
generation, and that some wet steam fields have a probable cost advan-
tage. The structure of costs in geothermal power production is similar
to that of hydroelectric plants. Almost all costs are capital costs,
of drilling, pipeline, and generating facility, with small charges for
maintenance.
1.2 The Institutional Environment
In a later section the implications of institutional peculiar-
ities for the behavior of the geothermal industry will be discussed.
As background to that discussion, a brief summary of those features is
presented here.
The sale of electricity is an activity regulated by statewide
regulatory commissions in 47 states, including the State of California.20
Entry into electricity distribution is virtually impossible for a new
firm, since exclusive franchise areas covering practically the entire
United States have already been grant~d. Commissions review electricity
rates and determine an acceptable rate of return; hence the behavior of
a regulated utility will differ from that of an unregulated competitive
firm in terms of its demand functions for inputs and supply function of
electricity.
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Transmission of electricity is inseparable from production.
Since construction of a new transmission line is a process which ex-
hibits increasing returns because of right-of-way costs, an established
utility located at a geothermal field may have a competitive advantage
over newcomers. To some extent this advantage can be overcome if
the Federal Power Commission requires the owner of an interstate
transmission line to wheel power for other producers if it has excess
capacity.
The production of energy from geothermal steam also brings pro-
ducers under the purview of various agencies with regulatory jurisdic-
tion over environmental effects. These reviews have imposed delays and
costs on the development process which we will ignore except for this
recognition of their existence.
At the other end of the production process is the acquisition of
land. Geothermal energy is a commodity fixed in location, and access
to steam depends on access to land. Private, state and Federal lands
lie above the resource, and the owner of the land is in a position to
receive rent for the use of his resource, either in the form of a con-
tinuous royalty payment or a lump sum. On private land, leases which
have been examined by other researchers are pure royalty and rent
leases. 2l On Federal lands all lease sales to date have involved both
lump sum payments and royalties.
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers the exploration
and development of geothermal resources on Federal land. The BLM takes
three major actions in regard to geothermal development: it classifies
lands, it issues prospecting permits, and it leases lands for explora-
tion and production. Lands may be classified as prospective geothermal
resource areas (PGRA) or known geothermal resource areas (KGRA). A
PGRA is so classified on the basis of surveys carried out by the United
States Geological Survey (USGS) which indicate a possibility that a
geothermal reservoir may be found there. A PGRA becomes a KGRA in two
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ways: 1) evidence based on survey drilling that a field is capable of
producing a commercially usable fluid, or 2) requests for a noncompeti-
tive lease in the same area (and in a specified time period) by two or
more "knowledgeable" firms. When a tract must be offered for competi-
tive bids, the competition takes the form of "bonus" bids--a cash pay-
ment for the lease, which will contain a provision for royalty payments
of ten to fifteen percent of gross revenue from steam. Bids must be
accompanied by fifty percent of the total bid, with the remainder pay-
able when the lease is awarded. At that time various other bonds are
required. Leases are for a term of ten years with renewal for from
five to eighty years. The BLM has asserted the right to refuse all
bids if it considers the high bid too low.
A "grandfather right" is conferred on anyone who held a mineral
lease on and actively explored for geothermal steam on or near land
offered for sale at competitive bids. The holder of a grandfather
right will be awarded a lease if he meets the high bid. Leases are
also transferable after being awarded. 22
Two additional provisions of the leasing program are of interest.
A lease can be terminated, or renewal refused, if the developer does
not actively pursue exploration or development, although the Federal
leasing program is too new to give instances of enforcement. To pro-
mote competition in the industry, no firm may hold Federal leases for
more than 20,480 acres. If a firm puts land which it leases into a
unitized* field, the acreage no longer counts against its quota. 23
1'''Unitization'' is the creation of a single management group which con-
trols production from all wells topping a field.
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CHAPTER 2
THE VALUE OF A GEOTHERMAL LEASE
2.1 Economic Rent and Geothermal Energy
Economic rent can be defined as that part of the income of a fac-
tor of production above the minimum amount required to attract the fac-
tor into a particular use. The price of a factor is determined on the
margin, by the amount required to attract the least willing factor into
use. In competitive markets. a single price prevails for all identical
goods. Suppose there are three individuals. each holding a single unit
of some good. Person A is willing to sell his unit at $1. person B at
$2, and person C at $3. Suppose further that at a price of $3 each,
three units of this good will be purchased by some fourth person, so
that A, Band C each sells his good for $3. Then A earns $2 rent, B
earns $1 rent. and C just receives what is necessary to induce him to
sell.
Our hypothesis is that geothermal energy generates economic rent,
in that the investment and operating costs required to extract steam
from the ground and to use it to generate electricity are less, per
kilowatt-hour produced, than the price of electricity. Since geothermal
resources are small compared to the amount necessary to generate all
electricity, market competition cannot remove the rent inhering in the
resource. The cost advantage of geothermal energy will, if all relevant
markets are competitive and all electricity is sold at the same price,
accrue to the owner of the geothermal resource in payments for the right
to extract the resource. If markets are not perfectly competitive, the
distribution of the rent depends on features of the institutions and
markets for mineral rights, steam, and electricity.
-14-
Portions of the economic rent attributable to the geothermal
resource can be captured by any of four groups: electricity consumers,
in the form of lower prices; electric utilities, in the form of higher
total profits, possibly acquired through overcapitalization in response
to rate of return regulation; by steam developers, depending on the re-
lation between the price of steam, the cost of extracting it, and the
cost of a lease; or by landowners, as royalties, rents, or lump-sum
sales. Tax laws, the degree of competition, differences in knowledge
about the nature and magnitude of the geothermal resource, demand and
supply elasticities, and effects of regulation interact to determine the
exact distribution of rent. It is necessary to work through all these
effects to predict the likely rates of return received by geothermal
steam developers. We will then test these predictions with estimates
of lease payments.
Three markets must be considered simultaneously: the regulated
market in which utilities sell electricity; the free but complex market
in which one or a small number of utilities buy steam from a potentially
larger number of suppliers; and the market in which suppliers purchase
leases from landowners.
It is necessary to distinguish between the capitalized value of
the economic rent of geothermal land and the price of a lease. Under
certain special conditions the two are equal. If land is owned pri-
vately, if leases are freely transferable, if steam development and
electricity generation are characterized by free entry and perfect com-
petition, and if information is freely available and certain, leases
will sell at the capitalized value of rents. In general, at competitive
auctions they sell for less if uncertainty and/or a small number of
bidders are present.
Strictly speaking, the price of a lease would under ideal condi-
tions equal the capitalized value of economic rent plus the opportunity
cost of land. The opportunity cost of land would be the highest value
-15-
alternative use which must be foregone in order to exploit the goethermal
resource. If a tract of land has no alternative use, or if geothermal
development does not alter its usability for other purposes, opportunity
cost will be zero. In either of these cases, under conditions of perfect
competition among landowners, the supply of geothermal land will be per-
fectly inelastic--that is, a constant amount will be available indepen-
dent of price. Naturally, geothermal lands will differ in their stage of
development--from exploration to production--and in quality of steam and
cost of winning it. Exploration for and development of geothermal re-
sources is responsive to prices, so that perfectly inelastic supply of
land does not imply perfectly inelastic supply of steam.
A substantial amount of geothermal land is owned by the Federal
government, and leases on that land are sold at auction with sealed bids
by the Bureau of Land Management. The Bureau has the authority, which
it has exercised, of rejecting any high bid. However, the decision to
reject a bid usually reflects an estimate of a "reasonable" bid, and
cannot be interpreted as evidence that the Bureau itself has an elastic
supply curve of geothermal land. We will assume that geothermal land
is supplied inelastically by the Bureau, and that opportunity cost can
be neglected. To the extent that this is incorrect, we will have over-
estimated the magnitude of economic rent. However, that error will only
affect the share of rent accruing to the Federal government. This
public share will be reduced, but all other shares will be unaffected.
2.2 Monopoly Power and Rent
As long as the market for leases is competitive, the price of a
lease is determined by the value of steam output from the leased land,
and steam price and quantity decisions are independent of lease prices.
We can with these assumptions analyze just the steam market and the elec-
ricity market without considering what happens on the land market. The
amount of economic rent that forms the basis for the lease price will
depend only on the structure of the steam and electricity markets, and
-16-
the lease price will equal the present value of such economic rent if
all relevant markets are competitive.
To illustrate the dependence, assume that the market for steam
has a single buyer and many competitive sellers of steam, and that the
cost per unit of steam is constant for all amounts of steam extracted
up to the capacity of the field. The buyer will maximize profits sub-
ject to the supply curve of steam. The industry steam supply curve is
found by adding up the amount each firm will produce at any fixed price.
With constant unit cost of extraction, the industry will supply any
amount of steam from zero to the capacity of the field at a price equal
to average cost including normal profits (exclusive of leasing cost or
rent). Supply will be zero at any lower price and equal to capacity at
any higher price. If the utility offers a price equal to average cost,
it will get the entire output of the field (or as much as it wants); it
will receive the maximum profits; each supplier will just earn normal
profits; and rents or lease prices will be zero. As long as the util-
ity's cost of producing electricity using alternative fuels is greater
than the cost of production using geothermal steam priced at average
cost, the utility will be willing to buy geothermal steam. The quantity
it takes will be the quantity at which its increase in total production
cost from producing one more kw using geothermal steam equals the in-
crease in cost from producing one more kw using another energy source.
If this "marginal" cost of electricity is less for geothermal generation
than other means of producing electricity, even when the entire capacity
of the field is exploited, the utility will purchase the maximum amount
of steam.
The assumption of constant average cost is, of course, unrealistic.
As the capacity limit of the field is reached, the new wells will come
in at higher cost and will be less productive. Also the producers'
field management might be altered by utility behavior. Thus, by offer-
ing a higher price the utility could gain more steam, although the life
of the field might be shortened.
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If the market for geothermal steam is the only market in which the
utility is a monopsonist, we can derive mathematical expressions for
the price and quantity of steam it will buy. Let P (S) be the inverse
s
supply curve of the steam industry. With increasing marginal cost, the
construction of the geothermal steam industry supply curve is only simple
if we assume that the activities of one producer do not affect the pro-
duction conditions affecting another. That is, assume that if firm 1
increases its rate of extraction and that all else remains the same, then
the rate of extraction obtained by firm 2 does not vary. Then the indus-
try supply curve is simply the horizontal sum of each supplier's marginal
cost curve.
Assume that the utility sells electricity at a fixed price P and
e
purchases oil at a fixed price P , as would be the case on competitiveq
markets, but that it is the sole buyer in the market for steam. Its
P (S) is
s
It will act to maxi-the price at which quantity S of steam is supplied.
production function using oil is e = f (Q), with steam e = f (S), whereq s
Q and S are quantities of fuel oil and steam, respectively.
mize
n = P [f (Q) + f (S)] - P Q - P (S)S.
e q s q s
First order conditions for a maximum are
3n
- = P f '(Q)3Q e q Pq 0, and (1)
~ = P f I (S) - P (S) - P I (S)S
3S e s s s o.
(2 )
Equation (1) states the familiar proposition that under competitive
conditions demand for a factor of production is determined by equating
the price of a factor to the value of its marginal product. Equation
(2) differs from Equation (1) in that the utility can affect the price
of steam by altering the quantity it buys, a phenomenon ruled out in the
case of oil by the assumption of competitive markets. This phenomenon
is captured by the term P (S) + P '(S)S in Equation (2), which is
s s
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analogous to the marginal revenue function of monopolistic seller. If
the buyer of steam were one of many competitors, its purchase of steam
would not affect the price of steam, so that P '(S) would be zero. With
s
a single buyer of steam, P '(S) is equal to the slope of the supply
s
curve, which is positive when increasing price calls forth an increased
supply. Thus Equation (2) implies that the monopsonist utility pays a
lower price and purchases less steam than a competitive customer would,
assuming f II < O. Its profits will be the difference between cost and
s
revenues at the price and quantity determined by solving the first order
conditions together with the industry supply curve for an equilibrium
price and quantity.l Under these conditions some, but not all, of the
economic rent inhering in the geothermal resource will accrue to the
electric utility. In contrast, with constant average cost the monop-
sonist buyer of steam can purchase any desired quantity by offering a
price equal to the constant average cost of producing steam.
Realistically we cannot expect a utility to behave exactly as the
theory of monopsony predicts. First, the theory requires that the util-
ity have complete knowledge of the costs of steam production in order
that it be able to predict the industry supply curve. Uncertainty about
these facts may reduce the utility's ability to capture rents. Second,
any countervailing monopoly power held by steam suppliers will enable
them to claim some rents which would accrue to the utility under pure
conditions of one buyer and very many sellers. Nevertheless, the quali-
tative conclusion remains that if there is only one buyer of steam some
of the rent inhering in the geothermal resource will accrue to that buyer.
If steam sellers also possess monopoly power, some rent will also accrue
to them.
2.3 Regulation and Rent
We have assumed up to now that essentially the only element of
monopoly is in buying steam. If the utility is also the sole supplier of
electricity, we can make simple revisions in the first order conditions
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of profit maximation to include the effect of monopoly in selling elec-
tricity. If we replace the price of electricity, P , with marginal
e
revenue, equal to P (e) + P I (e)'e, we can demonstrate that the output
e e
of electricity is smaller, and the price higher, than under competitive
conditions. However, in most cases the utility is a regulated monopo-
list, and prediction of its behavior must take account of the effects
of regulation. The theory of the regulated firm is by no means fully
developed, and, in any event, the nature of regulation varies suffi-
ciently from company to company that it is doubtful that a single
theoretical model is appropriate.
We confine our inquiry to the following question--is there any
theory under which the utility would pay a price for steam that would
cause the lease prices of geothermal land to equal total rent? No
matter how the price of steam is determined, with a competitive steam
industry the amount of steam generated is independent of the amount paid
for leases. The price of steam will always be set at a level which just
leaves steam developers with normal profits. The true rent of geother-
mal land is found by comparing the cost of production (excluding leasing
costs) of electricity using geothermal steam with production cost using
the cheapest marginal source of energy. If the PUC could make the
utility act as if it were a perfect competitor, the landowners would
receive all these rents in the form of lease payments. The utility
would then earn only normal profits, as would the steam suppliers. All
other differences between geothermal production cost and the cost of
production in the marginal plant, which determines price to the con-
sumer, would go to landowners. Only if regulators set prices equal to
an appropriate fixed proportion of average cost and the demand for
electricity is elastic will a profit-seeking, regulated firm behave
as if it were competitive. Unfortunately, no PUC achieves this best
of all possible worlds.
One widely held theory of the effect of regulation, proposed by
H. Averch and L. L.Johnson (A_J),2 holds that when regulators specify
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the rate of return on capital investment that a firm may earn (between
the competitive rate and the rate earned under monopoly conditions), the
firm will adopt a capital-labor ratio larger than that which minimizes
the cost of producing its chosen level of output. The theory has no gen-
eral implications as to whether the amount paid for a lease by a developer
will exceed or fall short oJ the economic rent that would be generated if
all markets were competitive. Indeed, if it could be shown that under
rate of return regulation the price of steam, and hence the amount sup-
plied would exceed the competitive supply, we would conclude that lease
payments exceed the economic rent generated under competition.
The elasticity of supply of steam, the elasticity of demand for
electricity, properties of the utility's production function, and the
stringency of rate of return regulation all interact to determine the
relation between lease payments and rent. Different influences, how-
ever, act in opposite directions so that it is conceivable that a
regulated utility will pay more for steam than would a firm behaving
in a perfectly competitive fashion. Monopoly output restriction and
monopsony input restriction lead to a lower price and quantity of steam
than in competitive conditions. The tendency to overcapitalize pre-
dicted by A-J and other regulatory theories would work in an opposite
direction if geothermal energy production involved higher capital costs
to the utility than any other process.
Without substantially more data, we have no unambiguous explana-
tion of the relation between economic rent, rates of return, and lease
payments. However, some rough estimates in Table 2.1 of relative capi-
tal and operating costs of new plants using other sources of energy shed
some light on this relation. A power plant using geothermal energy has
a lower capital cost per kw capacity than a power plant using oil, coal
or nuclear energy. Moreover, if the utility purchases steam, the ratio
of capital to operating cost is also lower for a geothermal power plant
than for any other except oil. Hence the desire to over-capitalize would
lead the utility to prefer nuclear plants, for example, to geothermal if
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TABLE 2.1
OPERATING COST AND CAPITAL COST FOR
VARIOUS TYPES OF NEW POWER PLANT
Coal
Nuclear
Oil
Geothermal
Purchased steam
@ 2.5 mills/kwh
Capital
Fuel &
Operating
Capital
Fuel &
Operating
Capital
Fuel &
Operating
Capital
Operating
$670/kw installed capacity
(11.8 mills/kwh)*
11 mills/kwh>~*
$800-l000/kw installed capacity
(14.1 mills/kwh)*
8.5 mills/kwh
$390/kw installed capacity
(6.9 mills/kwh)*
11 mills/kwh***
$105/kw installed capacity
(2.1 mills/kwh»~
2.8 mills/kwh
Integrated operation Capital
Operating
$196/kw installed capacity
(3.9 mills/kwh»'-
1. 2 mills/kwh
*Based on a 12% discount rate, 80% load factor for oil, coal, nuclear;
90% load factor for geothermal.
**Based on coal in Utah at $16/T.
***Based on $7/bbl oil.
Source: Coal, Nuclear, and Oil: San Joaquin Nuclear Project, Draft
Environmental Impact Report, pp. 1.1-32 and 6.1-33. Geothermal:
Kaufman, "Economics of Geothermal Power."
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their overall costs were equal. This means that the regulatory effect
works in the same direction as the monopoly and monopsony effects, re-
ducing the equilibrium price and quantity of steam and hence the value
of a lease.
If the utility were able to run a fully integrated operation and
include steam-winning investment in its rate base, the regulatory effect
could result in an increase in the desirability to the utility of geo-
thermal energy production. With integrated operation the ratio of cap-
ital to operating cost is larger for geothermal production than for any
other process. Hence if the elasticity of demand for electricity is
sufficiently high, the utility should be willing to pay more for a geo-
thermal resource than is justified by the lower cost of producing elec-
tricity from geothermal energy_ In this case the utility will either
supplant the developer, by outbidding him for leases, or will purchase
steam at a price below that which would prevail in the complete absence
of regulatory effects. We conclude that if a market for steam exists,
the price of steam and hence the value of a lease will be less than we
would observe if all markets were perfectly competitive.
2.4 Vertical Integration and the Price of Steam
In the last section we argued that some of the markets we have
discussed may disappear, due to vertical integration, and that the
possibility of integration places additional constraints on the alloca-
tion of rent. In this section we examine vertical integration, and
its implications, in detail.
The essentially static approach developed thus far neglects cer-
tain peculiar features of the steam transaction, which have to do with
time, uncertainty, and investment planning. Arrow has argued that in a
multistage production process uncertainty in the delivery of an inter-
mediate product leads to vertical integration, so that the "downstream"
user can control deliveries of his inputs. 3 Although rates of output
from operating wells have been extremely reliable, production from new
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wells cannot be guaranteed in advance. A 100 MW power station is about
minimum efficient scale, and at the Geysers costs on the order of $11
million4--hence the costs of unreliable steam supply are substantial.
On the supply side the output of new wells cannot be sold unless a power
station of adequate size exists.
If a well is already drilled, the developer could be forced to
accept any price of steam above the minimal operating costs, which are
the only components of variable cost. Such a developer would accept a
price which did not pay more than a small return on his invested capital,
since his only alternative is to have no return at all. Hence the de-
veloper will want to negotiate a price in advance of drilling. Similarly,
a utility with an unused power plant would be willing to buy steam at a
price which reduced his return on capital to almost zero, although he
could achieve higher returns if he could make contracts in advance of
construction. Hence a steam developer with excess steam or utility with
a new power station is in an extremely unfavorable strategic position.
Normally we model exchanges as a sequence of spot transactions with
prices and quantities free to vary with market conditions. For the geo-
thermal stearn transaction, both sides will prefer to make future con-
tracts to avoid exploitation of their locked-in position. Unfortunately,
no active future market in steam deliveries exists because of their
fixed geographical location.
Forward integration by the stearn supplier is precluded by the dif-
ficulty of entering the electric utility industry. The possibility of
backward integration by the utility certainly exists, and A-J models
would predict that it wo~ld be advantageous because of the very high
ratio of capital to operating cost in integrated operation. This has
.
not happened, although this possibility may be as important as monopsony
power in keeping down the cost of steam. The substitute for integration
adopted at the Geysers is one of a long-term contract for stearn delivery
at a specified price per kwh of electricity generated by the purchaser,
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with an escalator clause tied to the price of alternative fuels.
The contract between Union and PG&E provided in 1971 for a steam
price of 2.5 mills per kilowatt hour of electricity generated by PG&E.
In 1973 the escalator clause raised the price of steam to 3.15 mills/
kwh; in 1974 the price increased further to 3.73 mills/kwh. The price
as of March 21, 1975 was 7 mills/kwh. 5
2.5 Internal Rates of Return and Lease Payments
Although data on marginal costs are unavailable, we can use pub-
lished reports of average costs of geothermal energy and estimates of
the costs of alternative energy sources to make a rough estimate of the
economic rent associated with the geothermal resource at the Geysers.
If we assume that when steam is purchased the regulatory bias is small,
but that the same bias encourages utilities to integrate backward into
steam production, the present value of economic rent places an upper
bound on the value of a lease. Alternatively, we can estimate the
value of a lease from current market conditions (where integration
backwards has not occurred), using the market price of steam to estimate
economic rent. In the next section we will also investigate the depen-
dence of the developers' rate of return on lease cost and the price of
steam.
Given tax laws, costs, and revenues, there is a fixed relation
between the value of a lease and the rate of return. That is, the
value of a lease is the present value of economic rents, using the rate
of return as a discount rate. We may view either as the independent
variable--that is, we can compute the value of a lease if a firm uses
an internal discount rate, r, or we can compute the internal rate of
return when the price of a lease is p. The following graphs and tables
present these calculations with the cost and revenue estimates stated
in Table 2.2.
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TABLE 2.2
COSTS AND REVENUES OF 100 MW POWER PLANT
ASSUMING 5 MW PER WELL
6
20 wells @ $350,000 per well $7,000,000
7
Pipelines @ $10 per kw 1,000,000
TOTAL Steam Investment $8,000,000
8
Power plant investment $11,600,000
Well operating costs per year9 $600,000
Plant operating costs per year
@ $.00045/kwhlO $355,000
Steam revenue per year @ 2.5
mills/kwh output and 12.5%
royalty = $1,725,000
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The Federal leases at the Geysers contain a provision for royal-
ties at 12.5 percent of gross revenue from selling steam, which we take
off the top. We assume a 90 percent load factor on the 100 MW plant.
100 MW capacity was chosen because data are readily available for that
size, and because economies of scale are small for larger plants. Sources
for other figures are referenced in Table 2.2. We obtain lease cost by
40 11 ' d 5 MW 11 . 11 hassuming a acre per we spaclng an per we capaclty. T e
figures are intended only as rough estimates. They support inferences
about the relative importance of various factors and the effect of dif-
ferent tax treatment, but estimates of rates of return are only as accu-
rate as the estimates of cost and revenues. If anything, production
cost estimates are high and revenues low.
Rates of Return to Geothermal Investment--No Backward Integration.
We use the data presented in Table 2.2 to estimate costs and revenues from
geothermal energy production, taking the present market structure (no
backward integration by utilities) as given. From these costs and reve-
nues we compute rates of return, over 20-year life of a well, on invest-
ment (including varying lease costs) in steam production, excluding
investment in power production from steam. We compute rates of return
to steam production (asOa function of lease cost) at a steam price of
2.5 mills per kilowatt-hour of electricity produced under five assumptions
about tax structure.
(1) No tax.
(2) A corporate profits tax of 48 percent with deductions
allowed for operating cost and straight-line deprecia-
tion of investment over 20 years.
(3) The tax treatment accorded to the Geysers in Reich,
et al., viz 22 percent depletion allowance and expen-
sing of intangible drilling costs.
(4) The depletion allowance alone.
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(5) Expensing of intangible drilling cost, currently
allowed by the law, abolishing percentage depletion
for large firms.
In Table 2.3 the rates of return earned with various prices per acre of
land are tabulated. The relation between rate of return and price of
land is graphed in Figure 2.1.
Rates of Return to Investment in Fully Integrated Geothermal Power
Production. We next assume complete vertical integration to the sale of
electricity and find rates of return versus lease cost with the revenue
based at 6 mill/kwh and 7 mill/kwh price of electricity. In this inte-
grated approach it is impossible to treat depletion or royalties without
raising accounting problems of defining an internal price of steaul, so
that we simply compute before-tax rates of return and after-tax rates
of return under a flat 48 percent CPT, presented in Table 2.4 and Figure
2.2.* Although power plants last longer than 20 years, at these rates
of return the difference between 20 and 30 year life would increase
rates of return by less than 10 percent.
The after-tax rate of return vs. lease cost tables for the two
cases (no integration and complete integration) give a prediction of
the value of a lease under perfect competition in all markets, and can
be compared (when appropriately adjusted for uncertainty) to actual
payments to test the hypotheses of perfect competition.
It will be noted that the after-tax rate of return (Table 2.3)
is highest with expensing and the depletion allowance, but the depletion
allowance is being phased out under current tax laws. There will be
general equilibrium consequences of the removal of the oil depletion
*A 12.5 percent royalty and a 22 percent depletion allowance would roughly
cancel out, whatever the price of steam, because the tax saving from the
depletion allowance is just under 11 percent of the selling price.
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TABLE 2.3
RATE OF RETURN VS. LEASE COST
(NO BACKWARD INTEGRATION)
2 . 5 MILL STEAM
Before tax rates of return selling steam with well spacing of 1 per 40
acres and various per acre costs, assuming 20 year life:
Price per acre
($)
-0-
1,000
3,000
5,000
Rate of return
(%)
12.8
11.3
8.8
6.9
After-tax rate of return with corporate profits tax (CPT) of 48% and no
expensing or depletion allowance:
-0-
1,000
3,000
5,000
7.4
6.5
5.0
3.9
After-tax rate of return with expensing and depletion allowance:
-0-
1,000
3,000
5,000
7,000
9,000
10,000
16.8
13.9
9.8
7.0
4.9
3.2
2.5
After-tax rate of return with percentage depletion:
-0-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
10.7
9.3
8.1
7.1
6.1
5.3
4.5
3.8
After-tax rate of return with expensing of intangible drilling cost:
-0-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
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FIGURE 2.1 LEASE COST VS. RATE OF RETURN FOR VARIOUS FACTORS
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TABLE 2.4
LEASE COST VS. RATE OF RETURN
INTEGRATED OPERATION
Before-tax rates of return:
Lease cost Rate of return
($ ) (%)
6 mills ;,
-0- 18.6
1,000 17.8
3,000 16.3
9,000 12.8
10,000 12.3
15,000 10.3
20,000 8.6
7 mi11s*
-0- 22.9
2,000 21.1
5,000 18.7
10,000 15.6
15,000 13.2
20,000 11. 3
25,000 9.7
After-tax rates of return: 6 mills* 7 mills*
-0- 10.8 18.8
1,000 10.3 18.0
5,000 8.7 15.6
10,000 7.1 13.3
15,000 5.9 1l.5
20,000 4.8 10.0
25,000 4.0 8.8
30,000 7.8
40,000 6.2
50,000 4.9
*Price of electricity per kilowatt hour.
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allowance not considered herein. To the extent that it has served to
attract capital to oil production, the depletion allowance has served to
maintain low oil prices and higher levels of supply. Removal of the
depletion allowance can be expected to result in higher prices of oil,
which will in turn raise the rents accruing to alternative energy
sources, and hence other things being equal, the price of geothermal
steam. This will tend to counteract the fall in rate of return due to
elimination of the depletion allowance at constant lease prices pre-
dicted by the above table.
To include the effects of the depletion allowance and royalties
in our estimate of lease cost, we assume that the market is not inte-
grated, and that the utility pays a price for steam which leaves it just
a 10 percent rate of return. We find the rates of return accruing to
steam developers under these conditions at two prices of electricity.
Taking 6 mills as the price received per kwh of electricity, total
revenue is $4,720,000 annually, and net revenue is $4,366,000 per year;
for 20 years $11,600,000 must earn $1,360,000 per year to have a 10 per-
cent internal rate of return. Hence steam cost can be approximately
$3,014,600 per year. If 7,884 hours times 100,000 = 788,400,000 kwh
are generated, a steam price of 3.82 mills/kwh will produce that cost.
This is about the 1974 price of steam, and hence is the figure most
likely to represent expectations when leases were sold in 1974. We can
now rework the value of a lease with the figures in Table 2.5, which
are graphed in Figure 2.3. Thus, reading off the graph, a rate of
return to geothermal steam developers of 10 percent (after taxes) with
steam prices of 4 mills leads to a lease price of $10,000. At an elec-
tricity price of 12 mills/kwh rates of return will be almost double
those at 6 mills when depletion and expensing are allowed. With the
straight 50 percent CPT, or with no tax, a price of 12 mills/kwh will
double rates of return until lease costs become very large--$20,OOO
per acre or more--at which point the rate of return will be less than
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TABLE 2.5
LEASE COST VS. RATE OF RETURN
(%)($ )
Lease cost
Price of electricity 6 mills/kwh, steam price approximately 4 mills.
After tax
Rate of return
-0-
1,000
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
32
27
16.3
10
6.3
3.7
When the price of electricity is 7 mills/kwh, the price of steam can be
5 mills. The results are presented below.
-0-
1,000
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
41.4
35.6
22.0
14.3
9.9
7.0
4.8
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double. These rates of return are all so high that precise calculation
seems unnecessary.
One further dimension we may consider is the length of time be-
tween lease acquisition and the commencing of drilling and production.
If we fix both the firm's discount rate and the price of a lease, we
obtain the maximum delay immediately. Consider the case of 2.5 mill
steam, depletion and expensing. With the 20 percent after-tax rate of
return earned by oil companies in 1973 and a $500!acre lease, winning
bidders can hardly afford any delay in getting into production, since
they can earn only 17 percent if production begins immediately.
Unanticipated delays already have been encountered in the expan-
sion of the Geysers field. Hence the value of a lease predicted in the
preceding tables should be corrected to reflect the fact that revenues
will not begin to accrue immediately after the purchase of a lease. We
can do this by discounting the present value of ownership of an acre
of land back from the date at which production commences to the time of
acquisition.
For example, with a more normal 10 percent after-tax real rate of
return and assuming no backwards integration (see Table 2.3), a lease
is worth approximately $3,000 per acre (if expensing and depletion are
allowed). At an $800 winning bid, a firm can wait about 13 years before
this $800 accum~lates to $3,000 of foregone principal and income. If
the price of steam were high enough to capture all rents (the backwards
integration-case--see Figure 2.3), a 10 percent rate of return makes
an acre worth about $12,000. It takes 27 years for $800 to increase
15 times to $12,000.
If the Geysers field increased at a rate of 100 MW per year in
generating capacity, the entire 2,500 MW field would be in operation in
25 years. Ten years might be a reasonable delay to expect in getting
into operation, comparable to the time justified by the 2.5 mill price
and a 10 percent rate of return.
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CHAPTER 3
THE FEDERAL LEASING PROGRAM
3.1 Models of Competitive Bidding
Our source of data for testing hypotheses about the organization
of markets relevant to the development of geothermal energy is the Fed-
eral geothermal leasing program.
We must once again revise the simple economics of geothermal en-
ergy to account for distinctive features of the Federal leasing program.
It remains true that lease payments are price-determined, and that the
price of steam is independent of the size of leasing costs. However,
even if there is no collusion among bidders and perfect competition on
all other markets, the winning bid for a lease need not equal the eco-
nomic rent inhering in that tract of land. We will begin with a brief
summary of some relevant propositions in the theory of competitive bid-
ding, and then proceed to a statistical analysis of bids on Federal
geothermal leases. In Chapter 4 we will compare results of this anal-
ysis with estimates of the value of a lease and predictions of how
competitive firms will behave.
The theory of competitive bidding does not provide a complete,
general theory of how individuals will behave in bidding situations
of the type created by the Federal leasing program. It does, however,
contain insights from which we can construct an analytical framework
which suggests certain regularities we may observe in real bids. Three
subjects are of interest: 1) the relation between the expected value of
a tract and the size of bids; 2) the relation between the number of
bidders and the size of bids; and 3) the effect of uncertainty about
the value of a tract on the size and distribution of bids.
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Models of bidding are based on either game theory or statistical
decision theory. In all models a key concept is the expected value of
the object offered, in this case a lease to use the geothermal resource
underlying a tract of land. In Chapter 2 we argued that in a world of
complete certainty the maximum price a developer would be willing to pay
for a geothermal lease is the present value of net revenues attributable
to ownership of the lease. In simple game-theoretic models of competi-
tive bidding, the optimal strategy for each participant is to bid the
maximum. These models are of an unrepeated sale of one object to the
highest bidder at his bid, with a known or unknown number of partici-
pants, and assume either that each participant is certain of the value
of the object or that each knows exactly how every other participant's
valuation depends on his own. l
Many uncertainties arise in connection with geothermal development.
The more important have to do with the physical and chemical description
of the resource itself, the quality of the reservoir underlying the spe-
cific tract offered for lease, the time trend of input and output prices
and changes in tax laws, environmental regulations, and utility regula-
tions. We introduce these uncertainties by assuming that each developer
has a probability distribution over costs of production revenues which
will be generated by the tract offered. The expected value of a lease
is the mathematical expectation taken over this probability distribution
of the present value of net revenue.
In game-theoretic and decision-theoretic models of competitive
bidding with uncertainty2 about the value of a tract, it is demonstrated
that if each player is risk-neutral, he will bid strictly less than the
3
expected value of a lease. There are no general results on how much
less the bid will be. In decision-theoretic models of bidding the
reasons for this result can be described heuristically. Each partici-
pant forms a subjective probability distribution over his opponents'
bids, conditional on his estimate of the value of the lease. Possibly
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he does this by observing how they have behaved in the past. He also
computes his expected profit conditional on winning the auction. This
profit is a maximum, equal to the expected value of the lease, if he
bids zero. It is zero if he bids the expected value, and negative if
he bids more. Expected profit as a function of his bid is expected
profit if he wins times the probability that all his opponents will bid
less. This unconditional expected profit is zero if he bids zero--sure-
ly someone will bid higher than that--and zero if he bids his expected
value. Continuity of the probability function of opponents' bids im-
plies that unconditional expected profit is maximized if the bid is
. 1 I h h d I f h b . d 4strlct y ess t an t e expecte va ue 0 teo ject auctlone .
If the bidder is risk-neutral. that is, if he is indifferent be-
tween $X for certain and a lottery which pays Y with probablity P and
Y', with probability (l-P), and for which X = PY + (l-P)Y', then he will
choose to maximize unconditional expected profit. If the bidder is not
risk-neutral, the analysis is more complex, since two types of risk are
present--the risk of the object having less value than the winning bid,
and the risk of losing a prize worth more than the bid. 5 Since the
issue of whether or not corporations are risk-averse and why is still
the subject of much dispute, we will adopt the simple hypothesis of risk-
neutrality on the principle of equi-probability of the unknown. With
this assumption we conclude that bids are strictly less than the value
of a lease.
The decision-theoretic approach to competitive bidding has been
6
applied many times to bidding for oil leases. and hence may, despite
its defects as a general theory, be useful as a description of how these
firms will bid for geothermal leases.
A decision-theoretic approach leads to the further conclusion
that as the number of competitors predicted in an auction rises, the
optimal bid comes closer to the expected value. This result is useful
in evaluating how rent is distributed among different parts of the
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geothermal market. The case of perfect competition in the market for
land would be one in which there exist a large number of competitors.
Even without explicit collusion, limitation of the number of bidders
itself tends to produce an outcome more favorable to the bidders and
potentially less favorable to the seller. Although the mechanism is
different, the result is the familiar theorem about the Cournot solu-
tion in oligopoly. By collusion each bidder could be better off, but
as long as each bidder consciously considers the interaction between
his and other bids, the market works less well than under perfect com-
petition. The lack even of a general theory of oligopoly leads us to
be pessimistic about the existence of more general results about non-
collusive bidding. We can, however, expect that with "competitive"
bidding and small numbers of bidders the price of a lease will be less
than predicted with perfectly competitive markets.
The decision-theoretic approach has been criticized on the grounds
that it is in principle impossible to predict the behavior of competi-
tors on the basis of subjective probabilities, because of the infinite
regress of expectations and strategies in interpersonal decision prob-
lems. 7 By formulating the bidding process as a game and considering
equilibrium strategies, we cut through this regress. Game theoretic
models support the conclusion that with uncertainty bids will be strict-
ly less than the expected value of a lease, but are ambiguous in their
support of the contention that individual bids increase with the number
of competitors.
8Rothkopf shows in a game-theoretic model that with an optimal
strategy the bid submitted by a firm eventually decreases as the number
of bidders increases, although the value of the winning bid increases.
We can test Rothkopf's model against the decision-theoretic model (using
data from actual bids submitted for Federal geothermal leases near the
Geysers) in two ways. First, note that Figure 3.3 reveals some tendency
for bids by an individual firm to be a maximum when the number of bid-
ders is three, as Rothkopf's model predicts. However, we will later
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report on a regression analysis of bids versus number of competitors
which tends to support the decision-theoretic model.
Game-theoretic models do shed light on another subject, the dis-
tribution of bids in a single auction. A particularly simple model
appropriate to geothermal leasing was developed by R. Wilson. 9 The
equilibrium strategy is to bid a certain fractile below the mean of
one's posterior distribution function over the value of the prize. The
model requires specific distributional assumptions--that each partici-
pant has a diffuse normal prior and samples from a normal population.
In this case the population distribution goes through into the bid dis-
tribution. Bids will be normally distributed if each bidder follows an
equilibrium strategy.
In multiple auctions the existence of constraints on the amount
bidders can pay for all their winning bids, or interdependency between
the number of objects won and the value of the object, complicates mat-
10
ters considerably. Resale of leases raises additional considerations.
Detailed original research into modelling the geothermal, or the similar,
bidding process for oil leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is
required before such questions as the optimal distribution of bids for
different tracts offered for sale simultaneously can be answered.
3.2 Statistical Analysis of Bids
The literature on competitive bidding suggested some general regu-
larities in the distribution of bids offered on each tract. A specific
empirical proposition about bids on Federal Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
oil leases is that on each tract bids are approximately log-normally dis-
tributed. ll Hence we begin by performing a test to find if the logarithms
of bids in geothermal lease sales are normally distributed. We consider
the bids on each tract, for example the seven bids on Tract 1 at the
Geysers (Table 3.1), to form a single distribution, and test the hypoth-
esis that the distribution was log-normal.
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TABLE 3.1
GEOTHERMAL LEASE SALES
Date: January 22, 1974
Location: Sacramento, California
KGRA Acreage Tract Name of Bidder Amount Lease
Geysers 2,340 I Shell Oil Company 3,200,000,00 CA 949
Signal Oil & Gas Co., et aL 1,516,660.00
Union Oil Co. of Calif, 774,867.60
Thermogenics. Inc, 264,420.00
Geothermal Resources lnt'l., Inc. 50,333.40
Chevron Oil Co. 35,755.20
Northern California Power Agency 23,400,00
1,534 2 Shell Oil Company 1,300,000.00 CA 950
Union Oil Co. of Calif, 1,163,953.18
Natomas Co, 451,000,00
Thermogenics, Inc. 193,284,00
Dow Chemical Co, 38,516,87
Northern California Power Agency 15,340,00
175 3 Therrnogenics, Inc. 22,050.00 CA 951
Cecil Folmar 11,450.00
California Geothermal, Inc, 4,749.50
Union Oil Co. of Calif, 4,707.50
101 4 Union Oil Co, of Calif . 48,314.36 CA 952
Signal Oil & Gas Co. 28,381. 00
California Geothermal, Inc. 2,740.13
169 5 Union Oil Co. of Calif . 80,842.84 CA 953
Ronald B. Shoen 10,369 84
Edward B. Towne 211. 79
2,396 6 Union Oil Co. of Calif . 12,243.56 CA 954
Edward B. Towne 2,346.35
Edward B. Towne 150.08
626 7 Union Oil Co. of Calif. 318,120.68 CA 955
Signal Oil Co. (Gr. ) 180,288.00
250 8 Signal Oil Co. (Gr. ) 75,600.00 CA 956
Union Oil Co. of Calif. 57,045,00
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Table 3.1 continued
KGRA
Geysers
Acreage Tract Name of Bidder
160 9 Occidental Petroleum Corp. (Gr.)
Union Oil Co. of Calif.
Signal Oil & Gas Co.
Amount
163,360.00
129 ~161.00
32,480.00
Lease
CA 957
222
45
737
10
11
12
Occidental Petroleum Corp. (Gr.)
Signal Oil & Gas Co.
Union Oil Co. of Calif.
Thermogenics~ Inc.
Union Oil Co. of Calif. (Gr.)
Signal Oil & Gas Co.
Signal Oil & Gas Co.
Union Oil Co. of Calif. (Gr.)
Michael Belzer
226,662.00 CA 958
78,588.00
67,634.52
27,972.00
22,868.10 CA 959
4,770.00
56,666.00 CA 960
18,631.36
697,00
Note: (Gr.) = Grandfather rights.
Tracts 7 and 9 were rejected as too low.
Mono - Long
Valley 1~8l5
1~895
1,773
1,883
2,309
1,763
2~ 277
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Chevron Oil Co.
Geothermal Resources Int.
Getty Oil Co., et ale
Chevron Oil Co.
Geothermal Resources Int.
Republic Geothermal, Inc.
Union Oil Co. of Calif.
Getty Oil Co. ~ et a1.
California Geothermal
Chevron Oil Co.
No Bids
No Bids
No Bids
No Bids
-45-
18,459.36
9,080.00
98,592.00
25,073.63
9,480.00
515,767.07
281,504.76
92,196.00
52,507.37
27,069.13
CA 961
CA 962
CA 963
Table 3.1 continued
KGRA Acreage Tract Name of Bidder Amount Lease
East Hesa 2,240 1 No Bids
2,559 2 No Bids
1,868 3 Magma Power Company 4,203.00 CA 964
1,920 4 No Bids
2,240 5 No Bids
2,240 6 No Bids
2,400 7 No Bids
1,437 8 Hagma Power Co. 3,235.00 CA 965
2,549 9 Republic Geothermal Inc. 432,810.01 CA 966
2,560 10 No Bids
1,596 11 Republic Geothermal, Inc. 208,925.31 CA 967
1,760 12 Hagma Power Co. 3,960.00 CA 968
2,240 13 No Bids
2,560 14 No Bids
LEASE SALE - May 29, 1974, Sacramento, Calif.
Geysers 626 7 Natomas 2,055,000.00 CA 955
Santa Clara (city) 2~000.000.00
Eurmah Oil & Gas Co. (Signal) 1,087,000.00
Union Oil Co. 345,000.00
Occidental Oil Co. 335,000.00
160 9 Union Oil Co. 220,342.00 CA 957
Occidental Oil Co. 220,000.00
Burmah Oil & Gas Co. (Signal) 192.650.00
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Table 3.1 continued
KGRA Acreage Tract Name of Bidder Amount Lease
-
LEASE SALE - May 10, 1974, Vale, Oregon
Vale 1,347 1 Republic Geothermal 13,831,00 OR 1264
Union Oil Co. 7,544.15
Magma Energy 7,476.79
LVO Corp. of Tulsa 4,108.86
LEASE SALE - July 30, 1974, Roosevelt Hot Springs, Utah
Roosevelt
Hot Springs 2,560 1 Union Oil 51,993.60 U-27383
Gulf 23,372.80
Phillips 13,081,60
1,640 2 Phillips 87,543.20 U-27384
Union Oil 62,090.40
Gulf 14,973.20
1,920 3 Phillips 9,811,20 U-27385
2,453.5 4 Phillips 314,199.05 U-27386
Union Oil 93,234.14
Gulf 22,400.73
1,644 5 Phillips 8,401, 10 U-27387
Al Aquitane 5,877 .00
1,940 6 Phillips 248,391,58 U-27388
Getty Oil 53,350.00
Union Oil 46,672.30
Gulf 17,709.00
Al Aquitane 6,139.19
1,961 7 Phillips 41,856.28 U-27389
2,272.5 8 Phillips 62,902.80 U-2739C
Getty 28,412.50
Gulf 20,747.93
1,920 9 Getty 24,000.60 U-27391
Gulf 17,529.60
Phillips 9,811,20
American Oil Shale Corp. 4,992.00
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Table 3.1 continued
KGRA Acreage Tract Name of Bidder Amount Lease
Roosevelt
Hot Springs 2,560 10 Phillips 13,081.60 U-27392
2,480 11 Phillips 12,672.80 U-27393
40 12 (Grandfather tract)
Phillips 2,335.20 U-12990
A. L. MacDonald & Wn. 1. (Gr. ) 120.00
LEASE SALE - September II, 1974, Brady's Hot Springs, Nevada
Brady 988.85 1 Geothermal Resources, Inc. 6,500.00
640 2 Geothermal Resources, Inc. 6,500.00
Magma 1,497.00
640 3 No Bids
2.561. 2 4 Magma 5,993.21
2,560 5 No Bids
2,512.56 6 No Bids
2,401. 52 7 Hydro-Search, Inc. 15,108.61
143.37 8 Geothermal Resources, Inc. 1,000.00
Tract 4 was rejected as too low.
LEASE SALE - December 18, 1974, Reno, Nevada
Beowawe 1,942.64 1 Chevron Oil Co. 15,074.89
Southern Union Production Co. 2,002.00
2,478.72 4 Chevron Oil Co, 505,088.77
Natomas 37,180,80
2,520.62 5 Getty Oil Co, 45,371.16
Burmah Oil & Gas Co, 35,742,39
Chevron Oil Co. 25,256.61
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Table 3.1 continued
KGRA Acreage Tract Name of Bidder Amount
Beowawe 2,467.83 6 Chevron Oil Co. 95,490.92
Burmah Oil & Gas Co. 63,250.48
Natomas 37,017.45
2,418.53 8 Getty Oil Co. 30,231. 63
Hot Springs 2,141. 06 2 Chevron Oil Co. 115,274.67
Getty Oil Co. 12,846.36
2,560 3 Chevron Oil Co. 125.619.20
Getty Oil Co. 23,040.00
Brady-Hazen 2,561. 2 2 Natomas 51.224.00
Union Oil Co. 27.148.72
2.512.56 4 Natomas 37,688.40
-2,500 5 Getty Oil Co. 45 ,371.16
Burmah Oil & Gas Co. 35,742.39
Chevron Oil Co. 25,256.61
-2,500 6 Chevron Oil Co. 95,490.92
Burmah Oil & Gas Co. 63,250.48
Natomas 37,017 .45
-2.500 7 Getty Oil Co. 30.231. 63
Source: U.S. Geological Survey. Conservation Division, Menlo Park, California.
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Since we began with no information other than Table 3.1, a modi-
fied Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality with unknown means and var-
12iance was used. The test required at least four bids on a tract, so
that only nine bid distributions could be tested. The test was applied
to each of the bid distributions, with results presented in Table 3.2.
It was impossible to reject the hypothesis of log-normality at the 20
percent level in all but one of the nine tracts tested. Hence we con-
clude there is at least a certain structural similarity with oes bids.
One factor which could in principle affect the size of bids is the area
of the tract of land offered. Bids might increase more than proportion-
ately with the area of the tract if a minimum size tract is needed for
efficient exploitation. They might increase less than proportionately
if firms start to run out of money, with constant per acre bids as the
size of a tract increases. We find that lot size has no effect on the
size of bids.
A plot of bid per acre against lot size is given in Figure 3.1.
A linear regression of bid per acre versus lot size gives a correlation
coefficient, R2 , between bid per acre and acres of .00121, not signifi-
cantly different from zero at the .4 level. We will return to this
result to discuss the implications of independence of lot size for the
structure of the market for geothermal steam. The apparent indepen-
dence is used here to justify neglect of the size of the tract in all
analyses of bidding, and the use of bids per acre as the fundamental
data.
In two instances the BLM has offered for sale simultaneously a
number of tracts located near to each other, and received a significant
number of bids on each tract. On January 22, 1974, twelve tracts lo-
cated in the Geysers KGRA were offered for bids, and on July 30, 1974,
twelve tracts in the Roosevelt Hot Springs KGRA in Utah were offered.
One obstacle to the analysis of patterns of bidding for geothermal
leases is the extreme variability in quality of the geothermal resource
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TABLE 3.2
KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST
Tract
CA 949
CA 950
CA 951
CA 958
CA 955
CA 963
OR 12645
U-27391
U-27388
K-S Statistic
.1188
.4886
.2890
.2356
.2495
.1691
.2479
.1575
.1935
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.20 sig.
.247
.265
.300
.300
.285
.285
.300
.300
.300
.01 sig.
.348
.364
.417
.417
.405
.405
.417
.417
.417
in different areas. It might be expected that differences in the na-
ture of the resource, and in the knowledge which different firms pos-
sess about the resource, would swamp all other variables in explaining
differences in bids. But we must be able to compare bids between tracts
to infer anything about the factors which influence the size of bids.
We need, then, a number of physically similar tracts to be able
to learn anything about bidding: The tracts offered in these two sales
may be suitable. The test of suitability we propose is that the distri-
butions of bids on each of the twelve tracts should be the same. That
is. if the seven bids on Tract 1 at the Geysers, the six bids on Tract
2, etc., could have been drawn from the same distribution, we will con-
clude that there is an underlying similarity between the tracts which
justifies analyzing the entire sale at the Geysers as a unit. The same
procedure will be followed for the bids at Roosevelt Hot Springs.
We assume that all bid distributions are log-normal. The propo-
sition to be tested is that all bids come from the same log-normal dis-
tribution. Any log-normal distribution can be completely described by
two parameters, its mean and its variance. The mean of any distribution
can be estimated as the average, or arithmetic mean, of the sample ob-
servations. The variance, a measure of the spread of the distribution,
is proportional to the sum of the squared differences between each ob-
servation and the mean.
Thus, to test whether the distribution of bids per acre is the
same for all tracts, we must perform two tests; a test that the vari-
ances of each distribution are identical. and a test that the means are
identical. We tested first for similarity between tracts at the Geysers
KGRA, and then for similarity at the Roosevelt Hot Springs KGRA. At
both KGRA's we accepted the hypothesis of equality of variances. At
the Geysers we accepted, and at Roosevelt Hot Springs we rejected, the
hypothesis of equality of means. The tests performed were as follows.
The test for equality of variance among k samples drawn from a normal
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13 . . 2 . hpopulation is a likelihood ratio test. The test statist1c 1S X W1t
k-l degrees of freedom, and is unbiased. Since eight tracts at Roosevelt
Hot Springs are used, the statistic is x2 with 7 degrees of freedom. Its
value of 5.6614 is below the fiftieth percentile of the X2 distribution
with 7 degrees of freedom. Hence we cannot reject the hypothesis of
equal variances at the .5 level.
At the Geysers we made the same test using several sets of tracts.
Several alterations were made to the data at the Geysers. A tract which
sold for a bid of $5.11 per acre was excluded as clearly unusual, and
all bids by Edward P. Towne were ignored because of their very small
size and because of the fact that two bids under that name are listed
in one auction. First we used all tracts with two or more bids, except
the tract with a high bid of only $5 per acre (Tract 954). This gave
eleven tracts. The corrected X2 statistic with 10 degrees of freedom
was 15.73, and we could not reject the hypothesis of equal variances at
the .10 level.
Two of these eleven tracts were sold at auction held after that
at which the other nine were sold, because all bids on those tracts were
rejected initially by the ELM as too low. Hence the bids on these two
tracts may not come from the same distribution as the rest. Excluding
these two tracts gave a corrected x2 statistic with 8 degrees of freedom
of 6.41, and we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal variances at the
.5 level.
To test for equality of means we use a standard analysis of vari-
ance test, using the common sample variance estimated in the test for
equality of variances. 14 The test statistic is distributed as F with
k-l, n-k degrees of freedom, where n is the total number of bids. For
Roosevelt Hot Springs the F statistic is 37.92. With 7, 17 degrees of
freedom this is significant at the .10 level. Hence we reject the hy-
pothesis of equality of means. At the Geysers we excluded the tracts
rebid at a later auction and obtained a statistic of .8315, distributed
-53-
as F with 8, 23 degrees of freedom. This falls far short of signifi-
cance at the .05 level, and we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality
of means.
The different properties of the bids at the two KGRA's can be ex-
plained by a physical difference between the KGRA's. At the Geysers
there is a well explored, high quality field with uniform access to the
underground reservoir of geothermal steam. The identical distribution
of bids over tracts supports the hypothesis that bidders in the aggre-
gate believe this to be the case, even though different bidders appear
to make different estimates for specific tracts. Among oil companies
which bid on the Geysers there do not appear to be any systematic dif-
ferences among firms in belief about quality of the field as a whole.
(See Table 3.3 on bids by bidder.) Bids and high bids vary between
tracts for the same bidder. Firms not in the oil business, however,
appear to make substantially lower bids.
In Roosevelt Hot Springs we observe different features. Comparing
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 we observe that average variance (equal to the sum
of individual variances weighted by number of bids divided by total
number of bids less the number of tracts) at RHS is smaller than that
at Geysers, but mean bids are much lower. Moreover, we reject the hy-
pothesis of equal means at the .001 level. The spread is large relative
to the highest bid, as compared to the relation of variance to mean bid
at the Geysers. Moreover, a clear aggregate belief that tracts differ
in quality is observed. Phillips appears uniformly more optimistic than
other firms bidding (Table 3.1). These observations support the hypoth-
esis that on relatively unknown fields there is differential information
as to quality, since in the Geysers all oil companies appeared to behave
quite similarly.
The bids for Federal leases at the Geysers thus appear to be an
excellent data set for testing predictions about the influence of mar-
ket structure and number of bidders on the value of a geothermal lease.
We begin in Table 3.4 by pooling the bids at the Geysers to give some
summary statistics on the overall distribution of bids. We can compare
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TABLE 3.3
BIDS ARRANGED BY BIDDER
Tract Bid Bid/Acre Acres
Shell
1 3,200,000 1,367.52* 2,340
2 1,300,000 847.45* 1,534
3,874
Signal
1 1,516,660 648.14 2,340
4 28,381 281. 00 101
7A 180,288 288.00 626
7B 1,087,000 1,736.42
8 75,600 302.40;'c 250
9A 32,480 203.00 160
9B 192,650 1,204.06
10 78,588 354.00* 222
11 4,770 106.00 45
12 56,666 76.88* 737
1,209
Union
1 774,867.60 331.14 2,340
2 1,163,953.18 758.77 1,534
3 4,707.50 26.90 175
4 48,314.36 478.36* 101
5 80,842.84 478.36* 169
6 12,243.56 5.11 2,396
7A 318,120.68 508.18 626
7B 345,000.00 565.49
8 97,045.00 228.18 250
9A 129,161. 00 807.25 160
9B 220,342.00 1,377 .13*
10 67,634.52 304.66 222
11 22,868.10 508.18>" 45
12 18,631. 36 52.28 737
2,871
Occidental
7B 335,000 535.14 626
9A 163,360 1,021.00 160
9B 220,000 1,375.00
10 226,662 1,021. 00 222
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Table 3.3 continued
Tract Bid Bid/Acre Acres
Thermogenics
1 264,420 113,94 2,340
3 22,050 126,00* 175
10 27,972 126,00 222
175
Natomas
2 451,000 294,00 1.534
7B 2,055,000 3,282,74* 626
626
*Winning bid.
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TABLE 3.4
GEYSERS SUMMARY STATISTICS
Total of winning bids ~ total acreage
including rebid auctions
excluding rebid auctions
Unweighted average of winning bids
including rebid auctions
excluding rebid auctions
Mean bid/acre
including rebid auctions
excluding rebid auctions
Mean of normal distribution of logarithms
(natural) of bid/acre
including rebid auctions
excluding rebid auctions
Variance of log-normal distribution
actual sample variance
including rebid auctions
excluding rebid auctions
Estimated mean variance over tracts
including rebid auctions
excluding rebid auctions
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1,149.30
949.63
896.91
578.56
547.55
287.28
5.337
4.866
2.656
2.090
1.909
2.26
TABLE 3.5
MEANS AND VARIANCES BY TRACT
Geysers
Variance
Mean of Arithmetic of
Tract logarithms Mean logarithms fI Bids
949 4.617 369 3.829 7
950 4.903 343 3.314 6
951 3.903 61 .561 4
952 5.036 262 2.331 3
953 5.144 270 2.109 2
955 7.244 1,860 .812 5
956 5.571 265 .040 2
957 7.182 1,319 .0059 3
958 5.838 415 .736 4
959 5.447 205 1.228 2
960 3.786 51 1. 679 2
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Table 3.5 continued
Roosevelt Hot Springs
Mean of Variance
Tract logs of logs II Bids
U27383 2.28 0.48 3
U27384 3.27 0.88 3
U27386 3.57 1.75 3
U27387 1.45 0.06 2
U27388 2.92 1.88 5
U27390 2.67 0.32 3
U27391 1.83 0.48 4
U12990 2.58 4.41 2
Overall mean variance 1.19
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these summary statistics with similar statistics for Federal DeS leases
15
computed by K. e. Brown. In Table 3.6 Brown gives the estimated mean
variances of bids by sale for DeS oil leases. As in the case of geother-
mal leasing, each sale places for auction a number of individual tracts
of land. Within sales, Brown accepted the hypothesis of equal variance
of the bid distribution across tracts. If N. is the number of bids on
1
Tract k, k the number of tracts offered, and 5. 2 the estimated variance
1
on Tract i, the estimated variance is
A 2
E(N.-l) S.
.11
1
rn.-k
. 1
1
We see that the average bid on all Des sales is very close to the
average bid at the Geysers, but that the mean variance of geothermal
bids at the Geysers is larger than the variance at any DeS sale. The
mean variance of bids at Roosevelt Hot Springs is about the same as the
Des variances, but the average bid is much smaller. These results are
about what we would expect--greater uncertainty about profits from geo-
thermal development is reflected in the larger variance at the Geysers,
and in the larger spread relative to the mean at Roosevelt Hot Springs.
The results are in conformity with the prediction of Wilson's model that
the underlying probability distribution of the quality of a field will
be reflected in a pattern of bids with a related distribution. Bidding
theory also leads us to believe that bidders will behave differently
when they face stiff competition in an auction from the way they would
behave with little competition.
As we would expect, the winning bid increases with the number of
bidders (Figure 3.2). The average bid also increases, but more slowly.
A linear regression of winning bid against number of bidders at Roosevelt
Hot Springs gave a result of
winning bid
2R = .65, R
- 12.37 + 22.53 x no. of bidders
.43.
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TABLE 3.6
BROWN'S TABLE
Avg. Per
Sale Date Mean Variance Acre Bid
10/13/54 1.31 294
7/12/55 1.10 396
8/11/59 0.72 2,270
2/24/60 1. 75 532
3/13/62 0.88 186
3/16/62 1.10 288
10/09/62 1.45 2,710
4/28/64 1.11 1,850
Total 361
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At Geysers the same regression gave the result
winning bid
2R = .49, R
139.80 + 239 x no. of bidders
.24.
Regressing mean bid on number of bidders at the Geysers gives
mean bid = 156.54 + 94.47 x no. of bidders
2R = .31, R = .09.
There are differences in strategy between firms. When we arrange
bids by bidder (Figure 3.3), we discover that Signal, for example, made
bids which increased with the number of bidders, while Union's bids did
not. Regressing Signal's and Union's bids at the Geysers on the number
of participants gives
Signal bid = - 39.98 + 162.64 x no. of bidders
2R = .475, R .226.
Union bid = 503.64 - 3.31 x no. of bidders
2R = .015, R = .000225.
We cannot tell if these differences represent effects of different
information, different strategies, or other characteristics of bidders.
Although the bidding data do not help in isolating the effect of these
differences, we do note that oil companies are more successful than
other firms. Despite the fact all participating firms are well capi-
talized and clearly able to bid without external financing, the single
factor which explains high bids best is whether or not a firm is in the
oil industry.
The mean bid/acre by major oil companies is $1,038 per acre ex-
cluding the rebid auctions; including rebid it is $1,141 per acre.
These exceed the average winning bid because so many oil companies
make bids close to the winner, and taking the average bid as we do
weights in proportion to the number of bidders in an auction. Hence
the positive correlation between average bid and number of bidders
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tends to overweight contested sales, which end up with high prices being
paid. A linear regression of oil company bids vs. number of oil company
bidders (Figure 3.4) gives the result
oil company bid = - 433.67 + 404.8 x no. of oil company bidders
with an R2 = .294.
Other firms tend to make low bids throughout, and are more or less
uniformly distributed among auctions. The positive correlation between
bids and number of bidders is much higher for oil companies than for all
bidders together. In theory, there are two explanations of why the size
of bids and number of bidders are correlated. One explanation, which
implies that increasing the number of bidders would increase the size
of bids, is that when participants expect stiffer competition they bid
higher. The other explanation is that both the size of bids and the
number of bidders are determined by a third factor, the quality of the
tract. In this case policies designed only to increase the number of
bidders might not increase bids. The connection between quality of tract
and the size of bids is obvious, but the connection between number of
bidders and quality of tract is somewhat tenuous. For such a systematic
relationship to exist, there must be a substantial fixed cost to bidding--
otherwise the quality of the tract would influence only the size of the
bid, not the decision to submit a bid.
The existence of these alternative explanations should, however,
serve as a caution against basing leasing policy directly on assumed
causal relations between the number of participants and revenues to the
government. In addition it should be recognized that many other factors
than those examined in the statistical analysis affect the size of bids--
as is demonstrated by the rather low R2 reported in the regression equa-
tions. Other factors which vary from tract to tract and may affect bids
include grandfather rights, accessibility of the tract, stage of devel-
opment of the tract, and individual corporate budget limits and objec-
tives, including in particular the number of other tracts already won
or bid on simultaneously.
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CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURE OF THE GEOTHERMAL INDUSTRY
In a previous chapter we examined some aspects of the market for
electricity and market for geothermal steam from the point of view of
an electric utility. In this chapter we will attempt to assess the
competitive character of markets on which geothermal steam developers
trade--i.e., the steam and the land market. Federal lease sales at the
Geysers will form the basis of a case study of the relation between
rates of return on capital and the amount paid for a lease. We will
attempt to test the hypothesis that bidders are behaving as true com-
petitors in the lease sales. Comparison of the rates of return will
provide some relevant evidence. More evidence will come from the pat-
tern of bids itself, compared with expectations derived from bidding
theory.
We will then examine the outcome of the bidding process in terms
of the characteristics and concentration of winning bidders, and com-
pare the list of dominant firms with the list of dominant firms in other
areas of geothermal development. Finally, we will advance several al-
ternative explanations of the patterns which emerge, concentrating on
the concept of barriers to entry.
For all firms we computed an average bid per acre at the Geysers
of $275 to $325; for firms in the oil industry the average bid per acre
was $1,050 to $1.150. At approximately $300 rates of return exceed
10 percent in all but one of the cases considered in Chapter 2. When
these bids were made, January 22, 1974, the existing rule on tax status
was Reich, et al., which applied the percentage depletion allowance and
expensing of intangible drilling cost provisions of oil and gas tax law
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to geothermal steam at the Geysers. Hence the relation between rate of
return and lease cost derived on the basis of depletion and expensing
is probably most appropriate as the basis of bidding decisions. The
relation applies directly only to a firm with net revenue, exclusive
of geothermal operation, larger than the amount of intangible drilling
cost to be expensed. Otherwise it could not take full advantage of that
provision, and the actual investment cost would increase. This would
tend to make firms with inadequate taxable income from other sources
bid somewhat less than large firms. However, such firms have the option
of treating a drilling cost as a capital expenditure, and depreciating
it over the life of the well. This approach plus percentage depletion,
available to all firms, would result in rates of return reported in
Chapter 2 under the heading "percentage depletion alone". When steam
sells at 2.5 mills, the rate of return to the small firm when land sells
at $300 per acre is about 10 percent, substantially less than the 14
percent rate of return the large firm can earn paying $1,000 per acre.
The inequity in tax treatment does not alone explain the difference be-
tween oil companies and others, since a firm able to exploit depletion
and expensing could earn 10 percent paying $3,000 per acre, considerably
more than oil companies actually bid.
Moreover, it does not appear that aside from individuals making
trivial bids any of the bidders are really small. A summary of char-
acteristics of bidders is given in Table 4.1.
Relevant rates of return to compare with those on geothermal de-
velopment are given in Table 4.2. They are the ratio of after-tax
profits to stockholders' equity in various industries. Since some
leverage exists in all firms' financial structures, these are probably
overestimates of average rates of return to capital invested. Moreover,
marginal rates of return on investment--the relevant measures with which
to compare geothermal rates of return--are presumably smaller than the
average. Hence, if geothermal energy offers an average rate of return
above those tabulated, it is almost certainly a desirable investment.
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TABLE 4.1
BIDDERS ON GEOTHERMAL LEASES
Major Oil Companies
Union
Shell
Chevron (Standard of California)
Getty
Gulf
Phillips
Other Oil Companies
Occidental
Signal, acquired by Burmah in February. 1974. which is currently
trying to dispose of its U.S. assets
Natomas. 600 employees. 380 M assets, which acquired Thermal for
$20 M
Al Aquitane. 315 employess, subsidiary of Aquitane of Canada.
assets over $200 M
Other Large Firms
Dow Chemical
LVO Corporation of Tulsa. an energy related company with $39.3
million sales and 1.126 employees in 1974
Southern Union Production Company, with sales of $13 M and 110
employees -- a subsidiary of Southern Union Gas, with sales
of $131 M and 2,200 employees
Publicly Owned Utilities
City of Santa Clara
Northern California Power Agency
Geothermal Developers
Magma -- }1agma Power Co, has assets of $16 M, Magma Energy $3,5 M
Geothermal Resources International -- $5-6 M sales and 9 employees(?)
California Geothermal -- unable to find any information on assets
Thermogenics -- tangible assets over $1 M. Bid total of $506,000
at various auctions
Republic Geothermal -- reportedly well financed -- bid and won
leases totalling $1,157,000
Others - no information available
American Oil Shale
Hydro-Search
Source: Moody's Industrial and OTC Industrial Newsletter
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TABLE 4.2
RATIO OF PROFITS AFTER TAXES TO STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY
(Percent)
Year All Manufacturing
ERP FNCB
estimate estimate
Petroleum & Coal
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974~~
9.3
9.7
10.6
12.8
15.5
10.1
10.8
12.1
14.8
10.9
11.2
10.8
15.6
23.2
*Third quarter only. This is a new series calculated on a different
basis than earlier years. On this basis rate of return for all manu-
facturing 1973 (fourth quarter) is 14.3% for oil and coal 17.0%.
Source: Economic Report of the President, except FNCB and 1970-73
petroleum rates of return, from "Competition in the Oil Industry,"
published by Exxon.
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We note first that the 20 percent rate of return earned by oil
companies in 1975 cannot be achieved when steam sells at 2.5 mills, even
if land is free (Table 2.3). If the utility buying steam is held to a
10 percent rate of return and all economic rents are passed back to the
geothermal developer, with depletion and expensing he can earn over 20
percent rate of return paying $3,000 per acre when electricity sells for
6 mills/kwh (Table 2.5). This appears to be the situation in regard to
the price of steam in 1974. Hence at a 20 percent rate of return the
value of a lease will vary with market power in selling steam from 0 to
$3,000 per acre.
A 12 percent rate of return, characteristic of the oil industry
before 1973 and of other industries, would justify a bid of about $1,000
per acre under the tax treatment accorded the Geysers in 1974, even at a
2.5 mill steam price (Table 2.3). This lower rate of return is not un-
realistic since the 20 percent nominal rates earned in 1974 occurred in
a period of high inflation which would make real rates of return substan-
tially lower than nominal rates. Since we have included no inflation of
costs or revenues in our calculations in Chapter 2, the rates of return
as a function of lease cost are estimated as real rates of return. More-
over, even in 1974 the rate of return on Aaa corporate bonds never ex-
ceeded 9.27 percent. Since this source of financing is available to
major oil companies, even a risky investment offering a 12 percent rate
of return would appear profitable. If a real rate of return of 12 per-
cent were adequate the 1974 price of steam (4 mills) would justify a
bid of almost $10, 000 per acre (Table 2.5).
At rates of return appropriate to the oil industry, their average
bid for land at the Geysers falls between the minimum bid we would ex-
pect with competitive bidding for land and a monopsonistic buyer of
steam and the maximum bid which would be justified if steam developers
could capture from the utility large parts of the economic rent accruing
to geothermal energy. Bids are in fact far below that maximum. At
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rates of return characteristic of corporate bond yields (under 10 per-
cent), bids per acre are below the value of a lease under the most un-
favorable assumption about the price of steam, unless bidders do not
expect favorable tax treatment.
Three factors would tend to justify bids below the minimum we
calculate. One is the delay because of environmental considerations
or simply the time required to construct power stations, between lease
acquisition and beginning of production. A second is the possibility
of reselling a lease, which makes it unnecessary to be high bidder to
obtain the desired property eventually. Third, the small number of
bidders will, according to bidding theory, keep both the average and
winning bids down even in the absence of collusion. This is an effect
of small numbers, since even without collusion small numbers can cause
behavior to differ from the competitive norm. On the basis of relation
between rates of return and lease cost alone, we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis of competition in the market for leases with the qualification
that it is almost certainly "competition among the few". On the other
hand, we also cannot reject the hypothesis that developers obtain large
earnings selling steam and succeed in limiting competition for leases,
so that the price of land remains low. We must examine additional data
to find evidence to distinguish between these hypotheses.
There is a clear division in bidding practice between oil compa-
nies and other bidders. The fact that the average bid by oil companies
exceeds the average winning bid, and that the bid increases with the
number of competitors, is consistent with the idea that oil companies
compete vigorously with each other in acquiring leases. An alternative
explanation, that oil companies are bidding up leases in order to keep
others out of the geothermal industry is clearly false. Other barriers
to entry may exist, but the fact that oil company bids appear low at
reasonable rates of return is clear evidence that no such explanation
is needed. Indeed, winning bids are not so high relative to potential
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earnings that any investor able to raise sufficient capital and assemble
a drilling and exploration team would be deterred from entering the
field. To find barriers to entry we must look for difficulties in those
two areas.
Examination of standard measures of concentration of the geother-
mal industry reveals a potentially more disturbing pattern. We now
examine the entire Federal competitive leasing program, including all
fields leased up to December 1974. Table 4.3 gives the share of average
and total expenditure of all firms which won any acreage at all in the
auction. In Table 4.4 the names in order of rank of the top eight firms
in each category and the share of the top four and top eight in each
category are listed.
Since these auctions took place, Thermal Power Co., an operating
company in a joint venture with Magma at the Geysers, has been absorbed
by Natomas.
The share of expenditure is probably a better measure of concen-
tration than the share of acreage, since it weights physical quantities
by a market-determined estimate of their value. However, calculated
concentration ratios are about the same under both definitions.
This is fortunate, since leased Federal lands form only a small
fraction of total geothermal acreage, and we only have data on acreage
in other areas. We have not undertaken the major research project of
determining the share of top firms in all areas of geothermal activity,
but three increments to Federal leasing data suggest a pattern. In
Tables 4.5-4.7 we present data on acreage and share of various firms
in the Imperial Valley, the Geysers area, and on California state lands.
Of the four firms (or groups of firms) which hold an estimated 75 per-
cent of the geothermal land in the Imperial Valley, three appear in the
top eight of Federal acreage share, and the fourth is a group including
one of the top eight. At the Geysers two of the four listed appear in
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TABLE 4.3
FEDERAL LEASES
Acreage Share of Share of
Company Won1~ Acreage Rank Amt. Spent** Spending Rank
Union 5,431 .06570 7 $ 498,290.10 .0460 6
Shell 3.874 .04748 8 4,500,000 .4151 1
Signal 987 .01209 188,932 .0174 8
Thermo 175 .OO21L1 22.050 .0020
GRI 1,772 .02172 14,000 .0013
Chevron 15,904 .19495 2 970,498 .0895 4
Natomas 5,699 .06985 6 2,143,912 .1978 2
Occidental 222 .00272 226,662 .0209
Getty 13,753 .16858 3 273,798 .0253 7
Republic 7,265 ,08905 5 1,171,333 .1080 3
Magma 7,626 .09348 4 17,391 .0016
Phillips 18,870 .23131 1 813,867.61 .0750 5
Hydro-Search 2,401 .02943 15,108 .0014
*Total acreage - 81,578
**Tota1 spent - $10,840,736.12
-76-
TABLE 4.4
FEDERAL LEASES
Acreage Share Spending Share
Phillips Shell
Chevron (Standard) Natomas
Getty Republic
Magma Chevron
Republic Phillips
Natomas Union
Union Getty
Shell Signal
4-firm concentration ratio 4-firm concentration ratio
,688 ,810
8-firm concentration ratio 8-firm concentration ratio
,961 ,974
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TABLE 4.5
SALTON SEA
Company Leases Acreage Share
Union 136 28,620 .200
Standard (Chevron) 124 18,600 .130
Hagma 60 21,000 .147
SP Land 37,000 .258
(Assigned from Arco &
Imperial, shared with
Phillips & SCE)
Total of Top 4 105,220 .734
15 other 38,060
TOTAL 143,280
Source: Michael Sullivan, Steven McDougal, F. V. Huntley, "Patterns of
Geothermal Lease Acquisition in the Imperial Valley, 1958-1974,"
University of California, Riverside, August, 1974.
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TABLE 4.6
GEYSERS AREA - 1969
Signal 25,000 acres
Magma-Thermal 6,500 acres
GRI 1,680 acres
Union 9,000 acres
Occidental?
Source: D. A. McMillan, Jr., "Economics of the Geysers Geothermal
Field, California," Geothermics, Vol. 2, Part 2, 1705-1714.
-79-
TABLE 4.7
CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS
Leases
Company
Union
Acreage
4,000
Permits to Explore
Company Acreage Share of Total
Arco 3,900 .075
Getty 24,595 .470
Gulf 14,918 .285
American-Thermal 8,898 .170
Source: California State Lands Commission, "Geothermal Operations
and Leasing Procedures," March 14, 1975.
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the top eight of Federal lands on both lists, and an additional firm
(Signal) appears in the top eight of expenditure share. Union holds
the only actual leases on California state lands, but the free explora-
tion permits at least indicate interest, and the firms holding those
permits include one of the Federal top eight. Arco did not bid on
Federal leases, and Gulf bid unsuccessfully many times. If we pool
all the acreage on which we have information, we have Table 4.8, of
acreage and share in all these areas. The table has no particular
interest save as an indication that the pattern of concentration on
Federal lands is not immediately proved to be atypical by considering
other areas.
Hence we return to discuss concentration at the Geysers as a sub-
ject of potential interest. It clearly arises from the large difference
between average bids by oil companies and by others. We have seen that
this difference cannot be a result of predatory actions to exclude com-
petitors, since average oil company bids do not exceed conservative
estimates of the value of a lease. Part of the difference may be due
to the inability of small firms to capture the advantages of depletion
and expensing, and without those advantages the investment looks much
less desirable. A test of this theory can be made when another lease
sale at the Geysers takes place. The removal of the depletion allowance
for large firms but not for those producing less than 2,000 barrels of
oil per day should decrease the value of a lease to major oil companies
while keeping it the same for small. On the other hand, expensing of
intangible drilling costs remains on the books, so that small firms re-
main at a disadvantage. Hence, if there is a taxation effect, it should
reveal itself in significantly lower bids by major oil companies at the
next auction, similar bids by small companies still entitled to deple-
tion, and little difference in bids between the groups. These results
are predicted by the fact that the graph of rate of return vs. lease
cost under expensing almost coincides with that under depletion alone.
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TABLE 4.8
RANKING OF FIRMS WITH GEOTHERHAL
LEASES IN CALIFOm~IA
Name Rank Share
Phillips 1 .148
Union 2 .125
Getty 3 .102
Hagma 4 .093
Chevron 5 .090
Signal 6 .069
Gulf 7 .040
American-Thermal 8 .024
Republic 9 .019
Natomas 10 .015
Shell 11 .010
GRI 12 .007
Occidental 13 .0006
Control of Acreage
4-firm .468
8-firm .691
12-firm .742
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The magnitude of the difference in bids between the small number
of firms which dominate lease sales and the others suggests that there
is no active collusion among those bidders to keep their lease payments
as low as possible--i.e., just high enough to prevent others from par-
ticipating in their high rates of return. But, to explain why they can
bid low enough to obtain high rates of return, we must find some other
barriers to entry. By barriers to entry we mean technical or institu-
tional aspects of an industry which make it difficult for new firms to
compete successfully in some market with established firms (Table 4.9).
Capital market imperfections appear to limit geothermal develop-
ment to companies which can raise funds internally. This is also the
case of oil exploration. At a theoretical level default risk may be
cited as the source of these imperfections. Practically we observe
an unwillingness of banks to lend for this purpose. Moreover, the
California Commissioner of Corporations in 1974 ruled that stock issues
to finance geothermal exploration were excessively speculative, and
closed off that source of funds.
The phenomenon of default risk is worth exploring in detail.
The geothermal resource is characterized by uncertainty regarding
future net revenues from any tract of land. The price of leases at
the best fields is sufficiently high that there is substantial risk
that small firms will default on the loans used to finance purchase of
leases.
Default risk arises because of the progressively reduced uncer-
tainty associated with the field. If it becomes obvious that rents
will never cover the payments--of a loan or as royalties--the developer
will find it in his interest to default if his equity is sufficiently
small. This does not destroy the resource, but it does distort the
incentives perceived by participants in the competitive bidding, Losses
are limited to the equity of the defaulting corporation. By truncating
possible losses in the event of complete failure, this limitation of
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TABLE 4.9
SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE ENTRY RESTRICTIONS
1. Default risk-difficulty of bank financing
2. Commissioner of Corporations restricts
equity financing
3. Tax advantages different for Geysers and
other fields, different between firms
4. Capital rationing within firms and increasing
PV with slower development
5. Diversification and risk aversion
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liability makes the expected value of net returns larger to a small
firm than it is to a firm with equity large enough to cover all losses.
Banks, however, are perfectly aware of this possibility. One conse-
quence is that default risk can lead banks to ration capital--that is.
to refuse to lend more than a certain amount. depending on the other
assets of the borrower, at any rate of interest. This rationing could
itself form a barrier to entry requiring some minimum equity to allow
participation.
The system of bonus bids places an additional capital require-
ment on developers over and above the amount needed for exploration
and drilling. This cannot alone account for the lack of success of
small bidders, since in all the other areas we have examined leases
are on a pure royalty basis. requiring no initial investment. and yet
concentration is not substantially different. The real capital require-
ment which appears to make capital market imperfections a barrier to
entry is that for drilling. At a cost of $350.000 per well. requiring
40 acres of land at about $1.000 per acre, drilling cost is almost ten
times leasing cost.
There is another way in which restricted access to capital mar-
kets can form a barrier to entry even if smaller firms can raise enough
equity capital to invest in drilling on an efficient scale. A firm
which can sell bonds which qualify for an Aaa rating. for example by
borrowing to finance a safe. unrelated investment such as refinery
construction. can free up funds internally for investment in geothermal
development. If. for example, half the capital invested in geothermal
is raised in this fashion. the actual rate of return on equity will be
computed as follows. Each year the firm's gross revenue and costs will
be the same as for 100 percent equity financing; an additional cost
equal to the interest payments on bonds will be incurred. If bonds
have the same 20 year life as the revenue stream, and if the interest
on bonds is 9 percent. each year's net revenue will exceed 50 percent
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of the net revenue calculated on the assumption of 100 percent equity
financing as long as the rate of return with 100 percent equity financ-
ing exceeds 9 percent. Since equity capital forms only half of the
investment, the rate of return on equity is increased by access to debt
financing. In Table 4.10 we compute actual rates of return on equity,
assuming debt-equity ratio equal to 1, 9 percent intrest on bonds,
and the tax treatment of depletion and expensing, and a 2.5 mill price
of steam.
In Table 4.10 we observe substantial increases in the rate of re-
turn on equity as long as the rates of return on investment exceed the
bond rate. Since access to bond markets is restricted to large firms
with activities outside the geothermal field, these rates of return
help explain the high bids of such firms. This barrier compares in
magnitude and nature to those found in oil exploration and production,
yet in that industry there are 16 major integrated producers and hun-
dreds of small operators.
Finally, firms with restricted access to external capital markets
and limited assets may not behave in accordance with one of the assump-
tions made earlier with regard to bidding behavior--neutrality toward
risk. One reviewer of a draft of this report put the point very well
in arguing that the distinction between "oil companies" and others is
inappropriate: "The real distinction should be, however, organiza-
tions with large financial resources. The former, in this case being
oil companies, can minimize risk preference considerations and essen-
tially just play the odds with respect to both winning the lease and
the economic consequences thereof. By contrast, the organizations with
more limited resources can afford the mistake of bidding too low and
not winning the lease, but cannot afford the mistake of bidding too
much and leaving money on the table. The limited resource organization
must also limit its total exposure which means bidding on fewer leases
or bidding less on leases of interest. For these and other reasons
they bid more conservatively."
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TABLE 4.10
RATES OF RETURN ON EQUITY WITH
DEPLETION AND EXPENSING
Lease Cost ($)
-0-
1,000
3.000
5.000
10.000
Rate of Return on
Equity with 50%
Debt Financing
30
24
16
9
4.5
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Rate of Return
with 100% Equity
16.8
13.9
9.8
7.0
2.5
At OCS lease sales the eight-firm concentration ratios have been
as in Table 4.11, all but one of which are lower than the four-firm
concentration ratio at the Geysers. In production oil industry con-
centration ratios are even lower. These and other concentration ratios
in related energy fields are given in Table 4.11.
The lack of correlation between bids per acre and the size of a
tract found in Chapter 2 suggests that the barrier to entry operates at
an even lower level than one well. If it is difficult to raise debt
capital, large tracts will be less desirable to firms unable to finance
bonus payments internally since they will strain capital availability.
We might expect that bids/acre by non-oil companies, or the number of
bidders, would falloff as tracts get larger, yet this is not the case.
We might also expect oil companies to bid more on larger tracts since
they could then be in a position to construct an integrated operation
and capture rents which now stop at the electric utility. That this is
not the case is not completely explained by the absolute barrier to
entry into generation. With a field large enough to run a minimum ef-
ficient scale plant, a developer could contract with a new utility,
such as NCPA, to build a power station, as long as PG&E or other pre-
existing utilities could be made to wheel power. Perhaps these poten-
tial competitors make it necessary for PG&E to pass on a substantial
part of its "rents". If such is the case, the rate of return to be
expected by developers will rise to that predicted under integrated
operation at current lease sale prices.
Another explanation of the independence of bids/acre and tract
size involves another possible barrier to entry, a shortage of the
skills and personnel for geothermal exploration and development. If
we expect resources to go in general to the highest bidder, the short-
age would only be a barrier to small firms because of the expenditure
needed to hire a team away from its current employer. If we add, how-
ever, the assumption that exploration and drilling teams are indivis-
ible and must be of a certain minimum size, a real barrier exists.
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TABLE 4.11
EIGHT-FIID1 CONCENTRATION RATIOS - OCS
Date Ratio
10/54 67%
11/54 68
7/55 62
2/60 45
3/62 61
6/67 53
2/68 84
5/68 33
12/70 29
9/72 53
12/72 32
6/73 16
12/73 74
3/74 49
5/74 40
CONCENTRATION RATIOS
Area
Oil production
Gas production
Coal production
Uranium mill output
Uranium reserves
Geothermal leasing
4-firm
31
31
29
55
57
47
8-firm
50
46
39
78
69
Source: Exxon, "Competition in the Oil Industry"
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By itself that indivisibility would not give established firms an advan-
tage over new entrants. If, however, it requires either a large geother-
mal operation or other activities to keep a team employed, and if there
is uncertainty about the ability to obtain them on a part-time basis
when needed, large firms with such teams would have an advantage over
small rivals.
A small holding of land migh~ then be worthless because of the
difficulty of obtaining the skills necessary to work it, while a large
holding would require a prohibitive amount of capital to obtain.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
5.1 Conclusions
Six major conclusions follow from our investigation of the econom-
ics of geothermal leasing and development.
1. Even at high rates of return on alternative investments, bids
per acre for Federal leases in the Geysers field were less under tax laws
prevailing when the auction was held than they would be if all markets,
including that on which electricity is sold, were perfectly competitive.
2. Oil companies bid significantly more per acre than the average
of all bids, and this difference is larger than can be explained by tax
advantages accruing to large firms, especially since oil companies ap-
pear to have more profitable alternative investment opportunities than
do other firms.
3. There is evidence suggesting that the geothermal industry is
very concentrated.
4. There is evidence consistent with the belief that oil compa-
nies compete to some degree with each other for leases, but the compe-
tition is not perfect.
5. There may be substantial barriers to entry in the geothermal
field.
6. We cannot tell who is receiving the bulk of the economic rent
inhering in the geothermal resource, but qualitatively it is apparently
shared by landowners, developers, and either or both utilities and con-
sumers. That is, landowners should be willing to accept lower lease
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prices, developers should be willing to pay more for leases, and
utilities pay more for steam without hindering the development of
the resource.
5.2 Recommendations for Further Research
1. The manner in which electric utilities are regulated has im-
portant effects on their demand for geothermal steam, and consequently
on the incentives and returns facing geothermal developers. Research
is needed on the effects of current regulatory practice and on the im-
pact of changes in regulation, particularly with regard to rate struc-
ture, allowing utilities to drill for steam, and allowing new entry
into electricity generation. Even though Averch-Johnson models of the
effects of regulation are much in vogue, projects which propose alter-
native theories of regulation should be encouraged.
2. There is enough evidence that concentration and barriers to
entry characterize the geothermal development industry that substantial
research on barriers to entry, and on the general assessment of the
degree of competition in geothermal development, is justified.
3. Theoretical modelling and empirical study of the competitive
bidding process for geothermal leases and for the related Outer Conti-
nental Shelf oil leases should be supported. Research directed at
obtaining quantitative estimates of the reduction in bids resulting
from small numbers of bidders and uncertainty about the quality of
lease tracts should be particularly encouraged.
4. In OCS bidding a clear difference in bids between "wildcat"
tracts and tracts contiguous to wells already in production has been
observed. Research attempting to identify the effects of asymmetric
information on the pattern of geothermal bids is also needed.
5. The straightforward task of estimating the cost of finding
steam and producing electricity under varying conditions must be pur-
sued vigorously, as the basis for all definitive economic analysis.
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